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NEIL A. SWAINSON*
The Columbia River Treaty-Where
Do We Go From Here?
INTRODUCTION
When John Krutilla wrote his classic study on the Columbia River
Treaty nearly twenty years ago, he wisely devoted part of his introduction
to reviewing a number of ways in which cooperative international river
development can be justified.' Readers of this article are encouraged to
read or re-read Dr. Krutilla. At the same time it will be helpful if we
begin with a reminder that while we have learned a good deal about
international river development over the last generation, the advisers to
the governments of Canada and the United States forty years ago were
well aware at that time of the fact that the case for or against the coop-
erative development of shared watersheds is far from being a self-evident
one. They were conscious of the relevance to it of the great range of
values associated with such river development.2 To some extent they were
also aware of the manner in which actions on international rivers, whether
upstream or downstream, can produce sets of benefits and costs distributed
in .extraordinarily asymmetric ways between upstream and downstream
riparians. Furthermore, they were sensitive to the fact that when two
nations share a watershed, and when the two sectors of it have been
developed to very different degrees, differing national perspectives are
almost bound to complicate. the processes of adjustment required when
the prospect of seemingly justified cooperative development emerges.
Thus it is reasonable to suggest that when Canada and the United States
asked the International Joint Commission (UC). in March 1944. to in-
vestigate whether further development in the Columbia watershed would
be "practicable and in the public interest from the points of view of the
two Governments," ' that they had some feeling for the complexity of
*Professor Emeritus of Political Science. University of Victoria
1. See generally J. KRUTII.LA. THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY: THE ECONOMICS OF AN INTERNA-
TIONAL RIVER BASIN DEVELOPMENT (1967). For information regarding the Columbia River Treaty.
See CANADA DEPARTMENTS OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL RESOURCES.
THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (Feb. 1944) [hereinafter cited as THE
COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY AND RELATED DOCUMENTs]. See also Columbia River Treaty. January 17.
1961. United States-Canada. 15 U.S.T. 1555. T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
2. See L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD. BOUNDARY WATERS PROBLEMS OF CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES: THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION 1912-1958 164-65 (1958).
3. Id. at 164.
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what they were about. At the same time, this UC reference was based
on a perception, shared by the two nations and by the government of
British Columbia. that the response to their inquiry might well be positive.
The reasons for this are clear. While less than one-sixth of the entire
Columbia River basin lies in Canada. it produces a disproportionally large
share of the Columbia's average flow.' Furthermore, not only is the
Columbia's run-off in the natural state highly variable regionally, but also
it varies dramatically from month to month, and indeed from year to
year. Additionally, in 1944. the watershed of the Canadian mainstream
was entirely undeveloped and contained, as did the watershed of some
of its major tributaries, some superb storage sites.- In short, the possibility
existed that some works in Canada might generate significant benefits,
especially in the form of flood control downstream in both countries, and
enhanced electric power generation at site and downstream, again in both
countries. The issue which prompted this investigation, and ultimately
led to the Columbia River Treaty of 1961, was the possibility of creating
storage in Canada which could generate system benefits which might be
shared by both countries. A related prospect stemmed from the fact that
five of the Columbia's tributaries (one twice) and some of its secondary
tributaries are, as the mainstream is, transboundary waters.6 The possi-
bility was recognized in 1944 that some development on them. might
literally straddle latitude 49°N.
Only the highlights of the immediate response to the challenges just
identified can be reviewed in the space available here. A major exercise
in data gathering, especially concerning the Canadian watershed, had to
precede the analysis evoked by the UC reference. For a decade and more
the bulk of the effort required to produce it came from personnel drawn
into an infrastructure established by the UC, largely from the staffs of
the two federal governments and their agencies, and joined in time by
some technical personnel from British Columbia.7 Although during the
1950s the UC moved to produce a comprehensive analysis of almost the
entire range of Columbia development options. its efforts were compli-
cated in a number of significant ways. One of these involved the emerg-
ence of proposals to proceed with incremental development in the basin-
in 1951 concerning projects at Libby on the Kootenay and at Waneta on
4. INTERNATIONAL COLUMBIA RIVER ENGINEERING BOARD. WATER RESOURCES OF THE COLUMBIA
BASIN: REPORT TO THE I.J.C. 33-34 (1959) [hereinafter cited as BOARD REPORT TO THE I.J.C.I.
5. Id. at 43-88.
6. CANADA. DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL RE-
SOURCES. THE COLUMBIA RIvER TREATY AND PROTOCOL: A PRESENTATION 29 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY AND PROTOCOL]. The Kootenay River crosses the border twice.
7. N SWAINSON. CONFLICT OVER THE COLUMBIA: THE CANADIAN BACKGROUND TO AN HISTORIC
TREATY 41-42 (1979).
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the Pend d'Oreille, and in 1954 projects at Mica Creek on the Columbia
itself and on the Arrow Lakes. Only the relatively small Waneta project,
with almost no storage capacity, was cleared to proceed at the time.
Another complication was the emergence of a determination by the
governments of Canada and British Columbia to veto clearances for proj-
ects requiring UC approval, such as Libby, until the United States had
explicitly accepted an obligation to credit Canada with some share of the
benefits accruing to the United States as a result of storage in Canada or
extending into it. This position was not formally conceded until 1958.
The analysis under UC auspices was affected as well by the lack of support
from the American federal government for storage construction in the
American basin during the Eisenhower years.' It was complicated also
in the mid-1950s when the government of British Columbia became
openly skeptical of the perceptions emerging in Ottawa concerning the
form of Columbia River development likely to be in the best interest of
Canada, by British Columbia's willingness to consider incremental de-
velopment without waiting for the emergence of a "master plan," and
by its determination not to allow the Canadian co-chairman of the UC,
General A.G.L. McNaughton. to play a key role in harmonizing different
perspectives on Columbia development held in Ottawa and Victoria.9 The
UC's analysis was delayed also as a result of that body's involvement
with the development of the St. Lawrence River, and pursued, after 1955,
in the knowledge that advances in high voltage transmission technology
were giving some credibility to alternatives in British Columbia and the
United States to storage on the Upper Columbia River.'"
Quite apart from the investigation pursued in governmenfal offices for
the UC, the in-house technical advisers to the governments of Canada,
the United States. and British Columbia produced further analyses of their
own. Additionally, after 1955, the governments of Canada and British
Columbia agreed to commission major Columbia River studies from ex-
ternal consultants, and to exchange these, as they sought to indentify in
a competitive manner an optional policy for Canada to pursue."i In any
8. J. KRuTR.LA. supra note 1. at 12.
9. N. SWAINSON. supra note 7. at 94.
10. From 1958 on. Canadian and American governmental personnel working on the LC Columbia
River studies were very conscious of the way in which new transmission technology was being
incorporated into feasibility studies of power development on the Peace River in northern British
Columbia. These studies led to: R. CHANTRILL & J. STEVENS. A REPORT ON POWER CAPABILITIES AND
OPERTING ASPECTS OF THE PEACE RIVER POWER PROJECT AND A PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL POWER POOL(1960) (prepared for the Peace River Power Dev. Co.. Ltd.).
II. See MONTREAL ENGINEERING COMPANY. LTD.. PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CANADA'S WATER POWER RESoURCES IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN (1957) (prepared for the gov-
ernment of Canada). and CRIPPEN-WRiGHT ENGINEERING. LTD.. HYDRO-ELECTRiC DEVELOPMENT OF
THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN IN CANADA (1959) [hereinafter cited as CRiPPEN-WRIGHT REPORT) (pre-
pared for the government of British Columbia).
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case. in 1959 the UC's Columbia River Engineering Board, in a massive
report. responded affirmatively to the question asked by the two govern-
ments in 1944, identified three alternative schemes of development with-
out opting for one, and recognized the existence of others.'- Furthermore,
after another reference to it, at the end of 1959 the UC produced a set
of principles designed to govern the selection of a set of cooperatively
developed projects, and to guide both the determination of and the division
of the benefits derived from them. 13
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By 1959, although over -fourteen years of effort had produced much
basic and widely agreed-upon data and analysis, they had not evoked a
consensus either across the international border or between the govern-
ments of Canada and British Columbia as to which projects should finally
be seriously considered for cooperative development. The consensus was
sought when, before reaching an understanding with British Columbia,
in January 1960 the Canadian government inaugurated formal negotiations
with the United States.leading to a Columbia agreement, and pursued
concurrent negotiations with the province. Both sets of negotiations lasted
through that year. "
Out of this complex environment came the treaty, signed on January
17, 1961, which provided for cooperative Columbia River development
over a sixty year period-after which it may be cancelled on ten years
notice. " Canada undertook to build three projects, committing in the
process 15.5 million acre-feet of storage to jointly controlled operation.
In return she was credited with one-half the present value of the flood
damage prevented downstream from 8.5 million acre-feet of this storage,
to be prepaid on the completion of the Canadian storage. As well, Canada
was to receive title to one-half the downstream power produced in the
United States from the Canadian storage. This was to be returned to
Canada, although provision was made for disposing of portions of it in
the United States. The United States at the same time was given an option
to build a project at Libby in Montana, with Canada to provide its flowage
area in Canada, and to receive title to the downstream benefits derived
from Libby in Canada.
Although the U.S. Senate gave its consent to the Columbia River Treaty
within two months of its signature, thirty-nine months were to pass before
12. BOARD REPORT TO THE I.J.C., supra note 4. at 67. 97-110.
13. 1. KRmm.DA. supra note 1. at 59-67.
14. N. SWAINSON. supra note 7. at 121-85.
15. Columbia River Treaty. supra note I. art. XIX, para. 2.
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the Canadian Parliament endorsed the treaty by resolution.16 This is a
simplification of reality, but still an accurate statement, and one largely
explained by the post-January 1961 decisions of the government of British
Columbia to sell in the United States the whole of its downstream power
entitlement, for a period at least, and secondly, after mid-year 1961, to
move ahead with a major development on the Peace River. 7 Two years
of intense federal-provincial controversy were evoked by these provincial
initiatives. Following a change of federal government in Canada in April
1963, a sale of the Canadian power entitlement was provided for in a
protocol'8 to the treaty which also contained some clarifications of and
modifications to that agreement, and in a related power sale attachment,
both of which were signed in January 1964.' 9 After the formal power
purchase agreement had been signed between Canada's treaty entity, the
B.C. Hydro and Power Authority, and a new American instrumentality,
the Columbia Storage Power Exchange (consisting of forty-one utilities),
in August 1964, and after the Canadian Parliament had examined the
entire arrangement between April and June of that year, the treaty and
protocol were ratified and proclaimed and the power purchase agreement
was brought into effect on September 16, 1964.
The treaty, now slightly over one-third of the way through its minimal
projected life, has been implemented basically as intended. Two Canadian
storages, Duncan and. High Arrow, were completed ahead of schedule,
and the third, Mica, on schedule.20 The United States picked up its option
to. build Libby, which became operational in 1973. Since 1964 B.C.
Hydro and the joint American entity, the Bonneville Power Administration
and the Corps of Engineers, have been responsible for the management
of the Canadian storage under the provisions of the treaty. Their primary
instrument has been an eight member operating committee, drawn equally
from the technical personnel of the two entities. 2' The entities' efforts,
in turn, have been monitored as the treaty provided by a Permanent
Engineering Board, with power to settle disputes, and containing two
representatives from each country.' Fortunately, the entities' performance
has been exemplary, and the Engineering Board's role largely a routine
one.
16. The Treaty was endorsed by the Canadian Parliament on June 10. 1964.
17. N. SWAINSON. supra note 7. at 187-249.
18. THE COLUMBIA RrvE TREATY AND RELATED DOCUMENTS. supra note i. at 111-14.
19. Id. at 117-20.
20. The Duncan Lake storage was completed on July 13, 1967: High Arrow Lake on Oct. 10.
1968: and Mica was completed on Mar. 29, 1973.
21. See P. WANDSCHNEIDER, CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF THE COLUMBIA-SNAKE RIVER SYSTEMS
41 (Monograph XB 0937-1984. Agric. Research Center. Washington St. Univ.)(1984).
22. Columbia River Treaty. supra note I. art. XV.
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Readers interested in the intricacies of the production of the downstream
power benefit at U.S. federal and non-federal Columbia mainstream plants,
in the distribution of this benefit to its purchasers and in its subsequent
sale. should turn to two excellent monographs on the subject recently
produced by Philip Wandschneider. 3 They will find details there also of
the manner in which the operating committee already referred to, within
guidelines established by the treaty, regulates the use of Canadian treaty
storage via Assured Operating Plans, prepared annually six years in ad-
vance, and Detailed Operating Plans, relating to the year after the present
one. Both sets of plans feature rule curves governing the draw-down of
reservoirs for power production and flood control purposes, and are them-
selves subsumed, within limits, into more detailed planning pursued under
the auspices of the Northwest Power Pool and a Pacific Northwest Co-
ordination Agreement, which agreement itself is an outcome of the treaty.
When one takes into account the range of constitutional, treaty, and
statutory policy constraints relevant to the Columbia in the United States
and Canada, and the detailed adjustments ranging from monthly to weekly
to daily and hourly scheduling required to operate this river system, it is
not surprising that its management is extraordinarily complicated. As
Professor Wandschneider suggests, "it is remarkable how smoothly the
present system works."' That it does, he contends, is largely due to the
.2glue" of some sets of contractual agreements---of which the Columbia
River Treaty is one.' A good deal of the credit for the fact that the
administrative arrangements associated with the Columbia River Treaty
have worked well, beyond that accruing to the designers of the contractual
agreements in the first place. has to be attributed to able technical per-
sonnel in the entities, and their realization that, intelligently pursued, the
cooperative management of a river system can be a positive sum game.
LESSONS LEARNED
We must now turn first to some general reflections on the lessons which
may be derived from our Columbia River experience to date, and then
to some of the on-going problems facing a continuance of its cooperative
management internationally. Preeminently there was one quite extraor-
dinary feature of the treaty or, better, of its creation. This was the con-
sideration that, although the governments of Canada, the United States,
23. See P. WANDSCHNEIDER. supra note 21, and P. WANDSCNEIDER. MANAGEMENT OF A UNITED
STATES-CANADA COMMON RESOURCE: THE COLUMBIA RIvER (1983)(Dep't of Agric. Econ.. Wash-
ineton St. Univ.. Staff Paper #83-2) 1hereinafter cited as MANAGEMENT OF A UNITED STATES-CANADA
COMMON RESOURCE].
24. MANAGEMENT OF A UNITED STATES-CANADA COMMON RESOURCE. supra note 23. at 21.
25. Id. at 25.
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and British Columbia devoted so many years and resources to preparatory
data gathering and analysis, much of it shared under the auspices of the
LIC, the circumstance under which the Columbia was actually ultimately
developed was never made the subject of comprehensive examination.
This is a reference to the fact that, although the premier of British Co-
lumbia, the late W.A.C. Bennett, insisted repeatedly in public between
1958 and 1960 that he wished the Columbia to be developed in parallel
with the Peace River in the North, the technical planners of the Columbia
River Treaty did not assume in fact that this would be the case. 6 The
treaty was designed on the assumption that the Columbia would be de-
veloped first!
How could this have happened in view of the commitment to planning
and the associated investment in it generated in Victoria, Ottawa. and
Washington? There were several immediate explanations for this unusual
set of affairs. One was the outright opposition to concurrent Peace-Co-
lumbia River development at both political and technical levels in Ottawa,
and in Washington, which rightly feared that the then strained American
money market would have to finance both river developments, and amongst
technical advisers to the government of British Columbia. Much of this
opposition stemmed from an awareness of the cost of transmitting power
from the relatively isolated Peace River to the major market in British
Columbia, from a desire to bring lower cost energy on to the market first,
and from a desire to capitalize on the prospect of American assistance
for Columbia development before development in the American watershed
made its Canadian equivalent into a wasting asset.27 A second explanation
lay in the then modest size of the British Columbia energy market, and
in the existence at that time in Canada of a de facto ban on long-term
power exports which might have absorbed much of the otherwise surplus
energy from development of two rivers. 8 A third was the relatively late
stage arrival (1957-1958) on the analytic scene of the Peace River as a
potential energy source and energy bank. A fourth was a widespread
underestimation of the determination and tactical skill of Mr. Bennett.
And still another explanation lies in the fact that, in the face of all this
opposition, Mr. Bennett really followed the classic response to strategic
complexity; in a sense he split the problem. Unbeknownst to him, how-
ever, there were relationships between the two sections of it. with real
significance for project selection in a Columbia River development. 9
On a more profound level, this extraordinary state of affairs can be
26. N. SWAINSON. supra note 7. at 329-31.
27. Id. at 332.
28. Id. at 331-32.
29. Id. at 333. 362-63.
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attributed in part to the nature of the major bargaining which the approach
to the treaty evoked in Canada, and which we have already characterized
as a two-party contest. The two parties, of course, were the governments
of British Columbia and Canada. The point being emphasized here is that
the hidden hand in bargaining to which Charles Lindblom quite reasonably
directs our attention may largely be rendered inoperative in contests where
the search for allies and coalition building is not a major concern, and
where a tactical premium is placed instead on strategic intransigence."
This appears to have happened in Canada prior to and during the treaty
negotiations, and to have happened at least in part because of a tangling
of the jurisdictional roles of the two Canadian governments involved.
Such issues concerning the Columbia's development as a project selec-
tion, and the pace and scale of project building-all matters in which
Canada's national government tried to play a crucial role-are normally
in the Canadian federal system matters for provincial determination.'
One of the major ironies of the Columbia River decisionmaking is the
possibility that, insofar as Canada is concerned, if decisions on the issues
just mentioned had been left to the province with the basic proprietary
rights to the resource, the interaction of four public utilities within it. all
of which might have been responsible for marketing Columbia-Peace
energy, could easily have inspired the comprehensive assessment of the
implications for Columbia River project selection of concurrent two river
development-which we have already seen was not pursued.
All this really is just to underscore the basic proposition that analysis.
whenever sunk costs are large and decisions often irreversible, should be
made as synoptic as possible. This, of course, is the point to Dr. Krutilla's
study. He does not argue that the dictates of economic efficiency ought
necessarily to override all other considerations when cooperative river
development is being considered, but he does suggest, unanswerably,
that .insight into the economic opportunity costs of policy options ought,
where possible, to be available at least to illuminate the act of choice.3 2
The decisionmaking apropos the Columbia also emphasizes the wisdom
of Amitai Etzioni's endorsement of mixed scanning, involving a periodic
setting aside of a concern over means as policy makers refocus on goals,
and on the basic assumptions being fed into their calculations.33 A periodic
30. See C. LINDBLOM. THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 33. 47. 54-86 (1965).
31. N. SWAINSON. supra note 7. at 352-55.
32. See J. KRLmuA supra note I. at 99. ch. 9, 10. A major goal of Krutilla's work was to
demonstate the complexity and the breadth of the planning horizon involved in the analysis required
to compare the net benefits associated with mutually exclusive components in cooperative and non-
cooperative system development.
33. Etzioni. Mixed Scanning: A Third Approach to Decision Making. 27 PUB. AD. REv. 385
(1967).
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review and a reassessment of ultimate goals were notably missing in some
of the most crucial Columbia River decisionmaking.
There were some other features of the Columbia River's development
of particular interest to students of policy formation. One was that the
analysis conducted for so long under IC auspices was pursued from a
system perspective. Eventually the existence of an international boundary,
along with the concerns of two if not three friendly, but still different,
political systems had to be inserted into the analysis, and the negotiating-
cum-bargaining. The insertion had a major impact on the decisionmaking,
affecting .such questions as the allocation of costs, the determination of
benefits to be shared, and the selection of projects to be constructed.
British Columbia's representatives played a leading role in this process,
in 1959, as they persuaded first federal Canadian, and then American
representatives, that Canadian political reality required each riparian to
meet its own costs of cooperative development, and not to share them.'
It is now possible to argue that, realistic though the province was at the
time, the grossing formula for the determination of benefits which it
endorsed returned to haunt it. The sharing of costs may. well have to be
taken more seriously in the future as nations consider the merits of joint
project development, not least because this may be the only practical way
to hedge against the unexpected and unpredictable.35 Still it is necessary
to acknowledge in the real world of public affairs the necessity, on oc-
casion, of deferring to the sometimes perverse dictates of the nation state.
Something else was inserted into the decisionmaking in 1959. and that
was pressure, especially from the political level in Ottawa and Washing-
ton, to move to a decision quickly. A broad range of considerations.
including a desire by almost all concerned to bring to an end uncertainty
within the Columbia Valley itself, a desire to generate public investment
in a period of economic recession, a desire to capture the benefits of
Canadian watershed regulation which could be outflanked if preceded by
additional American storage, and a desire in Ottawa to forestall the Peace
River development, contributed to this new constraint on the analysts and
negotiators. Not the least of the consequences of the accelerated pace of
decision in 1960. and the mix of goals just alluded to. was that the
Columbia River Treaty acquired a specificity both with respect to project
selection and project development over an extended timeframe which
some of the most sophisticated planners of the treaty had hoped to avoid.
3 6
34. N. SWAINSON. supra note 7. at 109. 113.
35. Id. at 366. In logic only a considerable fluke could produce equal division of net benefits in
a cooperative system development via the use of a grossing formula. In this case. Dr. Krutilla
calculated that the considerable gain enjoyed by Canada was offset by an approximately equal
American loss-that. in effect, the treaty had produced overall no net benefit and possibly a net
loss. J. KRtUTLLA. supra note I. at 195.
36. See J. KRUTILIA. supra note I. at 203: N. SWAINSON. supra note 7. at 360-61.
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This last comment serves to emphasize the problems involved in any
long range assessment of project significance in the face of unpredictable
technical and economic change. One of the great difficulties faced in
comparing analyses produced about Columbia development between 1957
and 1961 was that so many utilized different discount rates."' The range
between them. however, was minimal compared to the wild swings in
the cost of money, not to mention in the value of energy and the cost of
material, which have distinguished recent years, .and which have be-
devilled attempts to improve the cognitive input into the act of decision.
This is not the least of the costs which modern man is now paying in
part for his folly in waiting so long to recognize the socially destructive
impact of inflation.
The specificity of the treaty, of course, in time served its purpose and
elicited the project development and operation already referred to. It did
so, however, in a manner which, at least in its early years and even before
its ratification, forestalled major adaptations to a rapidly changing world.
The decisions in British Columbia to go ahead with Peace River Devel-
opment, and in the United States to build the Dworshak Dam and the
Pacific Northwest-California and Southwest inter-tie, all taken before
1963. did in some measure render obsolete the case for parts of the treaty.
Only a complete revision in 1963 could have produced the adaptation
required. and in the end neither country felt prepared to risk losing agree-
ment on the cooperative concept in the process. The case for enshrining
an agreement to cooperatively develop a shared watershed in a treaty,
but for permitting subsequently the incremental approval of projects for
joint development, appears to be impressive in the light of the Columbia
experience.
One of the most notable changes in the environment of Columbia River
decisionmaking, of course, has been the weight now attributed in both
countries to environmental values. Environmental sensitivity was not
excluded from the calculus of 19603' but the overall emphasis on such
matters was not then what it has been since; the dominant values rep-
resented in the treaty bargain were those of flood control and power
generation. Two projects in the Canadian watershed, one at Revelstoke
37. The CRIPPEN-WRIGHT REPORT. supra note 11. used. for example. four percent: the BOARD
REPORT TO THE L.J.C.. supra note 4. used three percent; the Caseco Consultants. Ltd.. Report on
Columbia River Development: Prepared for the B.C. Power Commission (May 1961) used five
percent. Still a classic study of the significance of assumed interest rates on analytic findings is: Fox
& Herfindahl. Attainment of Efficiency in Satisfing Demands for Water Resources. in PAPERS AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMER. ECON. ASSOC. 198-206 (May 1964) (Resources for the Future. Inc.
reprint No. 46).
38. The opposition of British Columbia's government in 1960 to construction of major storages
in the headwaters of the Kootenay and Columbia Rivers in Canada was based, to a considerable
degree. on the likely environmental impact of such projects.
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on the mainstream, and the other at Seven Mile. on the Pend d'Oreille,
were the subject of very extensive environmental impact assessment be-
fore being approved in the 1970s.' 9 They have since been constructed.
Undoubtedly, however, the most significant manifestation of environ-
mental concern-at least for the future joint management of some aspects
of this watershed-has emerged in the United States, especially in a series
of decisions there concerning Indian water and fishing rights,' and in the
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act of 1980."
This last named statute has led to the creation of an eight member Power
Planning Council composed of two members from each of the four Pacific
Northwestern states, with a mandate both to create a Regional Energy
and Conservation Plan, including a Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program, and (to a degree currently the subject of some controversy) to
implement the said plans.' 2 The upshot has been the adoption by the
Power Planning Council of a water budget designed to enhance the re-
maining Columbia-Snake anadromous fishery, by assisting the spring-
time downstream migration of young fish through accelerated water re-
leases. 3 Within the last decade an explicit "fish flow" directed by fishery
interests rather than by project operators has become, in Professor Wand-
schneider's words, "a hard constraint" and in a sense "a full partner"
in the management of the Columbia's flow in the United States. We shall
comment shortly on what this may mean for the implementation of the
Columbia River Treaty.
Some very considerable challenges face the two entities in the years
directly ahead. Both of them, in the light of rapidly changing economic
circumstances, find themselves faced with domestic power surpluses-
one consequence of which is that B.C. Hydro, for the first time in almost
twenty-five years, now has no major power projects under construction.
Still, the current power surplus has not been without its compensations.
It recently came in handy, for example, when the entities had to face an
issue not anticipated in the treaty-the withdrawal of 4.3 million acre-
feet of storage in the Revelstoke Dam reservoir. Here, as so often happens,
lawyers coopted by the two entities gave quite different interpretations
39. Environmental impact statements were presented to public hearings on licensing of both
projects. (The record of the proceedings at the 1976-77 Revelstoke hearings tills 36 volumes.) See
E.NVIROCAN. LTD.. PEARSE-BOWDEN CONSULTANTS. LTD.. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT: SEVEN
MILE PRoJEcT (1973) (prepared for the B.C. Hydro and Power Authority). See also B.C. HYDRO
AND POWER AUTHORITY. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1976).
40. See. e.g.. United States v. Washington. 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash.. 1980). modified.
694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982). modified. 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985). cert. denied. 106 U.S.
407 (1985). See also P. WANDSCIHNEIDER. supra note 21. at 13-14.
41. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act. 16 U.S.C. §839 (1980).
42. Id. § 839b discusses the constitution, mandate, and operation of the Power Council.
43. See Northwest Power Planning Council. Draft Fish and Wildlife Program 26-27 (Sept. 16.
1982): P. WANDSCINE1DER. supra note 21. at 40.
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of the rights and obligations of B.C. Hydro as it faced this task. Ulti-
mately. technical personnel found a common sense solution to this prob-
lem in a joint sharing of the cost of this reservoir filling. In the course
of this solution Canada was able to export some of its surplus energy to
make up for American losses attributed to the Rev~lstoke impoundment.
Not all of the difficulties faced by the entities, incidentally, have been
as cleanly solved as this one. The responsible technical staffs have faced
some real problems stemming from the complexity of parts of the treaty.
Annex B. for example, raises issues over which the technically most
sophisticated sometimes disagree. Further, the task of both entities has
been complicated by a notable loss of "organizational memory,' as most
of the key personnel in the formative years of the treaty who incorporated
many informal understandings into its drafting, have left government.
retired. or died."M
It is this writer's understanding that the power surplus in the American
system during the first half of the 1980s helped its management respond
to the requirements of the water budget already referred to.45 When in a
few years time this surplus has evaporated, however, the trade-off between
operating there concurrently for fishery enhancement and power produc-
tion is likely to be a difficult one. It is not surprising, consequently. that
approaches have already been made to B.C. Hydro from the United States
seeking a modification of Canadian storage releases to accommodate in.
part these new requirements downstream of United States domestic law.
The Canadian Section of the Permanent Engineering Board has insisted
that the treaty be adhered to, not least in the calculations inserted into
the Assured Operating Plan as a guide to. the two entities and as a base
for calculating the downstream power entitlement. The current Canadian
position seems to be that if room can be found within the more up-to-
date Detailed Operating Plan for the Canadian storages to accommodate
some of the water budget requirements this will ,be done, but ohly if it
is possible to still adhere to the Assured Operating Plan in the process.
Exchanges on this issue can be expected to continue.
One of the most widely debated sections of the Columbia River Treaty
a quarter century ago (Article XIII) provides that Canada, which in effect
means British Columbia, has the right to divert successively larger por-
tions of the Kootenay River north into the Columbia twenty, sixty, and
eighty years after the treaty's ratification. The fact that the first of these
deadlines was passed in 1984 without any action being taken by Canada
44. For example, on the U.S. side: D. Lewis. C. Luce. and the late B. Goldhamnmer. On the
Canadian side: G. Kidd, G. Robertson. and the late A. Paget.
45. See Sheets, Roles and Responsibilities of the Northwest Power Planning Council, in THE
POLmcs AND ECONOMICS OF COLUMBIA RIVER WATER 32-35 (C. Broches & M. Spranger eds. 1985).
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reflects both the heightened sensitivity to environmental matters in British
Columbia already referred to, and a long-standing lack of enthusiasm in
its government-at both the technical and political levels-for "acting
on" the upper Kootenay in Canada at all. The diversion concept, of course,
was a crucial component of General McNaughton's plan for Columbia
River development.' At this stage, it is impossible to predict whether
those in political power in British Columbia will want to take up the first,
let alone the other diversion options just mentioned. The Mica and Re-
velstoke powerhouses have been engineered in such a way as to make
possible their handling the augmented mainstream flow which diversion
would involve.
Reference has already been made to the sale for thirty year periods of
the Canadian downstream power entitlement. Crucial to this transaction
was the determination of the amount of power actually being sold. 7 As
the sale was for the prepaid sum, before the event, calculations of the
benefit. being sold (in capacity and energy terms) were required, and
finally agreed upon. Although the sale itself was the subject of much
controversy in British Columbia twenty years ago, monitoring it has
attracted limited public attention there in recent years. On the other hand,
in B.C. Hydro and a few Canadian federal and provincial government
offices, there has been a good deal of interest in the relationship between
the before-the-event calculation of the power sold. and the after-the-event
calculation annually of the declining power benefit actually realized. Until
the mid- 1970s, the two sets of figures were remarkably close together.
Since that time, however, the downstream power benefit produced has
moved ahead of that earlier estimated, and paid for-in some years as
much as 30 percent! This discrepancy, of course, is a reflection of the
recognized risk in a prepaid sale; it could have varied the other way. Had
the evolution of the Pacific Northwest's power system from a primarily
hydro towards a primarily thermal base moved more rapidly than it did,
the downstream power benefit, in treaty terms, presumably would have
declined more rapidly.
In any case, the extent to which the downstream power benefit has not
declined, when combined with the great increase over the last twenty
years in the value of electrical energy, has produced a major change in
the significance of the Canadian power entitlement which will remain
between 1998-2003, the end of the thirty year sale, and 2024. the formal
expiry of the treaty. Initially at least this entitlement will be roughly
comparable to the planned output of B.C. Hydro's deferred Site C project
on the Peace River, which project in the early 1980s was expected to
46. Interview with A. McNaughton (Sept. 10. 1964). See also McNaughton. The Proposed
Columbia River Trearv. 18 INT'L J. 148. 160 (1963).
47. See THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY AND PROTOCOL. supra note 6. at 98-10 1.
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involve a $3 billion investment. In recent years B.C. Hydro's planning
has assumed that the Canadian entitlement would be returned to Canada
after the present sale ends, not least because by the dates in question its
own domestic load will be large enough to absorb what will be still a
sizeable block of power.
The long lead times now associated with power system management
are such that international negotiations on the use of the Canadian enti-
tlement will have to begin well before 1997, probably before the end of
this decade. At this point in time one can only speculate on the prospect
that all or part of the remaining entitlement might be the subject of another
sale. What is certain is that if such a possibility did emerge, British
Columbia would be very unlikely to accept any agreement which did not
contain provision for periodic adjustments in the price, and possibly also
periodic adjustments and revisions of the quantum of power being sold.
It is quite possible to envisage a whole range of organizational responses
to the question incorporated in the title of this paper-"Where do we go
from here?" Our answer to it could well be that there will be few, if any,
formal changes to the treaty and its associated agreements during the
remainder of the treaty's life. Under such circumstances British Columbia
would be quite free to take back the power entitlement after 1998-2003,
to insist on operating its storages within the constraints of the annually
revised Assured Operating Plans, and to be relatively inflexible in adapting
its storage releases to accommodate the American desire for fishery en-
hancement flow augmentation. The Permanent Engineering Board, at least
its Canadian section, and the government of Canada could well support
the province in such a stand, not least because of its effect on maximizing
the residual downstream power entitlement. As well, although this writer
hopes this does not happen, it is at least conceivable that the province
might invoke first stage Kootenay diversion rights. Indeed, it has the
option of moving to the second stage, a roughly 75 percent Kootenay
diversion, in 2024.
A related consideration to keep in mind when reflecting on this scenario
is that neither the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa nor the
government of British Columbia has forgotten that during international
negotiations in 1960 and in 1963, the prospect was raised that a Canadian
province might not be prepared to live up to the provisions of an inter-
national bargain to which, indirectly, it was a party." The determination
in Canada to prove otherwise, which is very real, tends to reinforce both
a close adherence to the provisions of the treaty and a feeling there that,
if modifications to it are to be advanced, they will have to come from
the other side.
48. N. SWAINSON. supra note 7. at 268-69.
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At the other extreme, of course, it is always possible that the treaty
and its related agreements might be reworked in the context of a formal
re-opening, involving a completely new set of international negotiations.
The chance of this happening, however, appears to be limited, in view
of the fact that neither country is calling for it. The point has already
been made that, in the changed world of the last two decades, both
countries do appear to have derived significant benefits from the treaty,
and their entities have been able to resolve a good many, if not all, of
the problems which have emerged in the course of its implementation.
Some informal use of a forty year period of stream flow records for the
river's management (where the treaty called for using a twenty year record
and the protocol for a thirty year period), and B.C. Hydro's willingness
to schedule storage releases on a weekly basis (where the treaty only
requires monthly scheduling), are but examples of modifications in prac-
tice which seem to have been agreed upon to make the cooperative system
work.
It should be noted that this writer's discounting of a major treaty re-
opening may improperly evaluate an inbalance in the role which the
Columbia River has come to play over the last decade in the political
systems of the Pacific Northwest. As the Columbia has moved well down
political agendas in Canada and British Columbia, with the result that
the key decisions concerning it in Canada since 1964 have been taken
by B.C. Hydro and a few government officials, quite the reverse has
happened in the United States. The 1980 Power Planning Act has opened
up the control and management of the American watershed to a broad
range of interested groups,' and to enhanced political direction. All ihat
can be said at this point about complete renegotiation is that if it did
occur, the evidence suggests that another time around Canada's identi-
fication of its goals would not be clouded by a federal-provincial juris-
dictional contest. In its handling of international negotiations involving
provincial proprietary rights, the Canadian political system appears to
have matured considerably over the last twenty years.
If a major treaty re-opening is unlikely, it still remains true that both
Canada and the United States have good reason to seriously consider
some modifications to the treaty and its associated agreements-at least
in the context of a range of bargains which, in fact, could move well
beyond the Columbia itself. The modifications could be incorporated in
an exchange of notes. perhaps a further protocol., and some supplementary
agreements. A new sale of downstream entitlement power could be part
of such an agreement. So could a formal deferment or abandonment of
Canada's Kootenay diversion options-with significant implications for
49. See Sheets. supra note 45. at 45-80.
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the future operation of downstream projects on the Kootenay River, both
in the United States and Canada. Some Canadian storage operation to
help with the United States fishery enhancement experiment could be
another component, perhaps facilitated in the short run by the current
power surplus in British Columbia. Still another provision in such an
agreement, for example, might authorize the scheduling of Canadian
storage releases (currently weekly, although the treaty in fact requires
monthly releases) on a daily basis. This has been requested by the United
States entity, but not agreed to, as it appears to create a new form of
downstream power benefit not identified in the treaty. Agreement upon
such scheduling is at least conceivable, however, if the new form of
benefit were recognized and shared.
To this observer, the primary incentive for British Columbia's partic-
ipation in adjustments of the sort just suggested would be the making
available to it of an opportunity to export some of its current surplus, or
prospective electrical energy. This would have to go to the American
Southwest. Both the Canadian and American Columbia River entities
share an interest in servicing this market which, in practical terms, may
well mean encouraging and facilitating an expansion of the inter-tie link-
ing it with the Pacific Northwest. Not only does B.C. Hydro have an
immediate surplus of energy, but in the short run it could build ahead of
domestic demand its two remaining Columbia River projects, a High
Arrow Dam powerhouse, and a dam at Murphy Creek. For longer term
exports British Columbia could also turn to some superb underdeveloped
hydro power sites on its northern rivers, such as Site C on the Peace
River. Until 1985 no government in the province was prepared to follow
the example of New Brunswick, Quebec, and Manitoba in actively seek-
ing and successfully negotiating long-term sales of large blocks of com-
pletely renewable hydro electric energy. The most that was done in the
early 1980s. was to approve a sizeable three year sale to Los Angeles,
which actually has been blocked by the lack of access to the required
transmission facilities."' However, in August 1985 British Columbia's
Premier W.R. Bennett announced that his administration would be pre-
pared to approve long-term power exports if a .satisfactory firm contract
could be obtained.52 He has since become actively involved in pursuing
50. For a succinct reference to the export of electrical power from Cinada to the United States.
see ECONOMIC CoUNCiL OF CANADA. CoNNiIEcTONs: AN ENERGY STRATEGY FOR CANADA.94-96 (1985).
For data on the magnitude of the exports from particular provinces, see Statistics Canada. Electrical
Power Statistics (July 1985), 8-9 regarding New Brunswick and Quebec. 10-11 regarding Manitoba.
51. See B.C. HYDRO AND POWER AUTHORrrY. NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD REASONS FOR DECISIONS:
IN THE MATTER OF APFiCATION UNDER THE NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD ACT (July 1984).
52. His announcement was made at the official opening of the Revelstoke Dam on the Columbia.
See Vancouver Sun. Aug. 29. 1985. at 1.
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such an agreement. All that can be said here is that a major export sale
requiring increased access for Canadian power to the Pacific inter-tie
would involve complex bargaining, which could lead both to modifica-
tions to the Columbia Treaty operation, and to the increased coordination
of the adjacent Canadian and American power systems.
There is another set of speculations to mention in conclusion, assuming
some modification of the arrangements bearing on the shared management
of the Columbia resource. These concern the strategies which, in the light
of earlier experience, the two countries might utilize to acquire the greatest
possible insight concerning their ultimate goals, the consequences of acts
of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior, and the ways of preserving
as much operational flexibility as possible into an uncertain future. The
ethos of our age suggests that these objectives in part might be sought
via massive exercises in public participation. On the other hand. the
implications of such a process are daunting, not least because of the
complexities of so many of the issues involved, and suggest that this time
the two countries might be wise, initially, to let the technical staffs cur-
rendy serving the two entities shape the basic dimensions of a reasonable
international bargain. Ultimately, as accommodation between conflicting
values is required, the politicians would have to be involved. Identifying
the mix of strategies actually utilized or considered will be one more
reason to continue to examine this on-going, far from perfect, and yet
not unsuccessful example of cooperative international river development.
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